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INTRODUCTION
Despite its repeal in 1987,1 the fairness doctrine remains one of the
most controversial issues in broadcast regulation today. Since the doc-
trine's demise, Congress has tried twice unsuccessfully to revive this
content-specific regulation which required broadcasters to actively search
for controversial issues of importance and present a balance of viewpoints
in programming exploring those issues. 2 The 101st Congress has once
again entertained a bill to codify broadcast fairness.3 H.R. 315, "The
Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1989," with a companion bill in the Sen-
ate,4 was introduced "to clarify the congressional intent concerning, and
* Assistant Professor, School of Communications, The Pennsylvania State
University. B.A., M.A., The Pennsylvania State University; J.D., The American
University; Member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
I The Federal Communications Commission repealed the fairness doctrine on
August 4, 1987. In an unofficial announcement of its decision, the Commission
reported that the doctrine had actually "'chilled' the speech of broadcasters and
could no longer be considered' narrowly tailored to achieve a substantial govern-
ment interest.' "The procedure through which the Commission ended enforcement
was by vacating a 1984 Order which found WTVH-TV in Syracuse had violated
the fairness doctrine. [Report No. MM-263]
I The first attempt to revive the doctrine was S. 742, the "Fairness in Broad-
casting Act of 1987." On June 19, 1987, President Ronald Reagan vetoed the
measure saying, "S. 742 simply cannot be reconciled with the freedom of speech
and the press secured by our Constitution." Later that year proponents of the
doctrine attached a rider to the appropriations bill.
H.R. 315, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
4 S. 577, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
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to codify, certain requirements of the Communications Act of 1934 that
ensure that broadcasters afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion
of conflicting views on issues of public importance."5 The House measure,
introduced by Rep. John D. Dingell of Michigan, was cleared for consid-
eration by the Full Committee on Energy and Commerce on April 5,
1989,6 and placed on the House Union Calendar on July 19, 1989.7
Much of the controversy surrounding the doctrine arises from the belief
on the part of broadcasters that any such content-specific regulation is
violative of their First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court rejected
that argument in 1969.8 Five years later, however, the Court struck down
similar content regulation affecting newspapers.9 The latest political ma-
neuvering over the doctrine has breathed new life into this First Amend-
ment argument and prompted a proliferation of purportedly less "chilling"
alternatives. Most of what has been posited is familiar territory. Among
the alternatives most often discussed are abandoning the case-by-case
evaluation in favor of a review at license renewal time and assuring access
to broadcast media for discussion of controversial issues. 10
While access may be a solution to the immediate fairness doctrine
dilemma, the problems associated with requiring broadcasters to relin-
quish time, coupled with determining which groups obtain access, are
arguably more restrictive than the fairness doctrine itself. Consequently,
it can hardly be purported that such a requirement is less violative of
the First Amendment.
The renewal proposal holds more promise of resolving the quandary
over broadcast fairness. This article suggests a new standard of reviewing
fairness complaints at renewal time which creates a strong presumption
in favor of the broadcaster. Part I of the article focuses on the development
of the fairness doctrine throughout its short history. In particular, it traces
the historical underpinnings of broadcast regulation examining the intent
and purpose of the fairness provision. Part II analyzes the judicial and
quasi-judicial enforcement of this regulation, particularly with respect to
political broadcasting. Part III traces the demise of the Doctrine and the
attempts to revive it. Part IV outlines the presumption in favor of the
broadcaster at license renewal time and concludes that this alternative
essentially frees broadcasters from defending their records, yet still pro-
vides a window of opportunity for groups validly claiming biased broad-
casting.
H.R. 315, 101st Cong., 1st Session (1989).
H.R. 315, 101st Cong., 1st Session (1989) Legislate, Legislative History file.
7Id.
8Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
o Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
10 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5272 (1987). See also Labunski, May It Rest in Peace: Public
Interest and Public Access in the Post-Fairness Doctrine Era, 11 COMM/ENT 219
(1989).
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PART I
Although the fairness doctrine was officially "codified"" in 1959 when
Congress made some changes to Section 315 of the Communications Act
of 1934,'12 the concept of fairness in broadcasting dates back much further.
Some members of Congress tried unsuccessfully to include a version of a
fairness doctrine in the Federal Radio Act of 1927 3 and again in the
Communications Act of 1934.' 4 It was during the twenties when broad-
casters were calling on the federal government to regulate the industry
because of chaos on the airwaves.'5 Virtually any citizen could obtain a
broadcast license, and so many did that the spectrum became crowded.'
6
The scarcity of spectrum space convinced lawmakers that a more dis-
criminating licensing procedure was needed. The government decided
that the spectrum was akin to a natural resource that belonged to the
public.' 7 For that reason, Congress placed no monetary value on it, but
rather told broadcasters they were public trustees, and as such had to
operate in the "public interest, convenience, and necessity."',,
A. The Acts
The Senate debates leading to the Federal Radio Act of 1927 included
discussion about the issue of fairness in broadcasting, particularly as it
related to public questions. This notion is illustrated by the exchange
between Senator Howell and Senator Dill on the Senate floor July 1,
1926: "Senator Howell: The Senator from Washington has left in the bill
a provision respecting candidates. It is important, but it has not anything
like the importance of the provision he has stricken out-the discussion
of public questions.'" Howell was concerned with the far-reaching effect
broadcasts could have on molding the views of the younger generation.
2
'
Senator Dill espoused a wait-and-see attitude.
I sympathize with a great deal of what the Senator is saying,
but I want to remind the Senator of the danger of having the
words "public questions" in the bill. That is such a general
term that there is probably no question of any interest what-
soever that could be discussed but that the other side of it could
"As this article will later explore, it is unclear whether the Doctrine was ever
codified. In fact, a finding to the contrary by the United States Court of Appeals
paved the way for the Federal Communications Commission to repeal the fairness
doctrine on August 4, 1987.
"48 Stat. 1082 (1934). Now codified at Title 47 of the United States Code.
1344 Stat. 1162 (1927).
"See supra note 12.
See National Radio Conferences, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1923, 1924, 1926.
16Id.
17 See generally, 67 CONG. REC. 5478 (1926).
18 47 U.S.C. 309.
1967 CONG. REC. at 12504.
20 Id.
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demand time; and thus a radio station would be placed in the
position that the Senator from Iowa mentions about candidates,
namely that they would have to give all this time to that kind
of discussion or no public questions would be discussed ...
opposition to [the public question provision] was so strong in
the minds of many that it seemed to me wise not to put it in
the bill at this time and to await developments, and get this
organization to function, and the bill can be amended in the
future.2 1
Meanwhile in the House, Representative Wallace White put forth his
own proposal:
We have reached the definite conclusion that the right of all
our people to enjoy this means of communication can be pre-
served only by the reputation of the idea underlying the 1912
law that anyone who will may transmit and by the assertion
in its stead of the doctrine that the right of the public to service
is superior to the right of any to use the either ... If enacted
into law, the broadcasting privilege will not be a right of self-
ishness. It will rest upon an assurance of public interest to be
served.22
The legislators eventually compromised by eliminating specific language
about public questions and instead opted for the broader "public interest,
convenience, and necessity" standard.
The result was the Federal Radio Act of 1927 which provided for a five-
member overseeing board, called the Federal Radio Commission. 23 The
Commission had operated for only seven years when President Franklin
D. Roosevelt called upon Congress to create a new "umbrella" agency for
all communications technology.2 4 Up until this point, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission and the Federal Radio Commission shared some de-
gree of control over communications in the United States. In a brief
message to Congress in 1934, Roosevelt made his request.
I recommend that Congress create a new agency to be known
as the Federal Communications Commission, such agency to
be vested with the authority now lying in the Federal Radio
Commission and with such authority over communications as
now lies with the Interstate Commerce Commission-the serv-
ices affected to be all of those which rely on wire, cables, or
radio as a medium of transmission. 25
Roosevelt insisted upon an organization with broad authority, not
merely an advisory board. "The new body should, in addition, be given
full power to investigate and study the business of existing companies
21 Id.
22 67 CONG. REC. at 5479.
44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
President's Message to Congress that it Create a New Agency to be known
as the Federal Communications Commission, Doc. No. 144 (February 26, 1934).25Id.
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and make recommendations to the Congress for additional legislation at
the next session."2 6
A bill changing some aspects of radio regulation had been passed by
both Houses of Congress in 1933, but did not receive the President's
signature and consequently died with the end of the session.2 7 Neverthe-
less, during the following session the Senate adopted some sections of the
previous bill in Senate Bill 3285.28 Also included in the package was
Roosevelt's request for creation of the Federal Communications Com-
mission, as was announced to his colleagues by Senator Clarence Dill.
29
During this Seventy-third Congress, debate concerning how the com-
munications field should be regulated continued, and there was renewed
interest in the fairness concept. Some members of the Senate pushed for
inclusion in the Communications Act of a version of what would later
become the fairness doctrine. The result was a provision which passed
the Senate but was later rejected by the House-Senate Conference Com-
mittee.30 The provision read:
[I]f a licensee shall permit any person to use a broadcasting
station in support of or in opposition to any candidate for public
office, or in presentation of views or a public question to be
voted upon in an election, he shall afford equal opportunity to
an equal number of other persons to use such station in support
of an opposing candidate for such public office, or to reply to a
person who has used such broadcasting station in support of
or in opposition to a candidate or for presentation of opposite
views on such public questions.31
Consequently, when the Act passed, no formal fairness doctrine was in-
cluded.
The early years of broadcast regulation, however, did not pass unscru-
tinized by the courts. Although no fairness doctrine as such existed, the
obligation to operate in the public interest, as public trustees, played a
pivotal role in determining which broadcasters obtained renewal of their
licenses. Just two years after passage of the Federal Radio Act, the Com-
mission denied a request for license modification by WCBD, a religious
station, to enable it to broadcast on a clearer frequency and for more
hours each day. The station unsuccessfully appealed the decision in Great
Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. F.R.C.32 The United States Court of Appeals
upheld the Federal Radio Commission's denial in an opinion by Chief
Judge Martin who wrote: "[i]t is our opinion that WCBD's application
was rightly denied. This decision is based upon the comparatively limited
public service rendered by the station .... .,,3
26 Id.
27 H.R. 7716, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
2 S. 3285, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1934).
78 CONG. REC. 8822 (1934).
3oHearings on S. 2910: Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interstate
Commerce, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1934).
31 Id.
32 Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Commission, 37 F.2d 993
(D.C. Cir. 1930), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706.
" Id. at 995.
1989]
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The public interest obligation continued to occupy a high place in the
minds of lawmakers and judges, and a year after Great Lakes, the stand-
ard was a ground for outright denial of license renewal. Such was the
case for KFKB and Dr. J.R. Brinkley.
Brinkley had obtained the license for the station in 1923. The entre-
preneurial physician quickly realized the commercial potential of this
young industry. Brinkley himself took to the airwaves to prescribe elixirs
to listeners who wrote him. It was no coincidence the "medication" pre-
scribed was readily available through the Brinkley Pharmaceutical As-
sociation and the Brinkley Hospital.8 4 The Commission denied Brinkley's
renewal application saying:
[T]he practice of a physician's prescribing treatment for a pa-
tient whom he has never seen, and bases his diagnosis upon
what symptoms may be recited by the patient in a letter ad-
dressed to him, is inimical to the public health and safety, and
for that reason is not in the public interest. 35
The appellate court upheld the Commission's decision to deny renewal of
Brinkley's license, reasoning:
When Congress provided that the question whether a license
should be issued or renewal should be dependent upon a finding
of public interest, convenience, or necessity, it very evidently
had in mind that broadcasting should not be a mere adjunct of
a particular business but should be of a public character.3 6
Throughout this germination period, the Commission and the courts
expressed concern over the imbalance of programming on radio. The issue
was complicated, however, and still is, because it treads on the First
Amendment's protection of free speech and free press. Delving into pro-
gramming, as opposed to mere technical proscriptions, would necessarily
require the Commission to exercise some degree of editorial control. The
extent of that control, if not its very existence, provides the basis for
continued debate over the fairness doctrine and the First Amendment.
Yet, in broadcasting's early years, a Commission decision and discussion
on content stopped many stations from exercising a valuable public func-
tion.
B. Mayflower Decision
In the late thirties WAAB, a Boston radio station, adopted a policy in
which the station aired its views on political candidates and other con-
troversial public questions.3 7 A former employee of the Yankee Network,
Inc., which owned WAAB, complained about the policy at a license re-
- KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc. v. Federal Radio Commission, 47 F.2d 670
(D.C. Cir. 1931).3
-1 Id. at 672.
36 Id.
37 Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940).
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newal hearing in November 1939. Curiously, Lawrence Flynn, the former
employee, was also at that time one of the owners of the Mayflower
Broadcasting Corporation, which was vying for a permit to broadcast on
WAAB's frequency.
38
Mayflower Broadcasting provided false financial information on its ap-
plication, causing the Commission to deny its request. Yet, the proceeding
provided the Commission the opportunity to scrutinize the Yankee Net-
work's editorial policy and release some tough language which was later
considered a ban on editorializing.3 9
The Commission claimed that the system of broadcasting as it had
developed in the United States embraced the concept of public interest,
and stations must dedicate themselves to it. The Mayflower decision fa-
vorably considered the fact that the Yankee Network had not acted in
such a way since September 1938 and thus had rescinded its [WAAB's]
earlier editorial policy. As a result, WAAB was granted renewal of its
license. 40 In granting the renewal, the Commission noted that the First
Amendment rights of broadcasters are subordinated to those of the lis-
tening public. "Freedom of speech on the radio must be broad enough to
provide full and equal opportunity for the presentation to the public of
all sides of important public questions, fairly, objectively, and without
bias. The public interest-not the private-is paramount .... -41
The importance of the Mayflower decision did not lie in the renewal of
WAAB's license, but rather in the future of editorializing in broadcasting.
At the time, the case had little impact on the broadcasting industry
because so few stations editorialized. Yet, those broadcasters whose in-
sight helped them to connect editorializing with public service were stifled
by the decision. Six years later the whole notion of public service and
public interest was called into question with the issuance of the so-called
"Blue Book," which also served to rejuvenate the concept of editorializing.
C. Blue Book
The Commission in 1946 released an essay on the public service re-
sponsibilities of a broadcast station. The document, which became known
as the "Blue Book"42 because of the color of its cover, grew out of the
Commission's realization that broadcasters, in many cases, were not liv-
ing up to the programming promises they had listed in their license
applications. 43 When the Commission looked at what licensees proposed
to broadcast when they filed applications and what they had actually
programmed, it found a number of discrepancies between promise and
performance. 44 As a result, temporary renewals were handed out by the
Commission in 1945 when it outlined preferred programming standards
for licensees.
3
1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING, 120 (Kahn, ed., 1984).
39 8 F.C.C. at 340.
40 Id. at 333.
41 Id. at 340.
42 Federal Communication Commission, Public Service Responsibility of Broad-
cast Licensees (Washington: March 7, 1946).
a Id.
-Meyer, The Blue Book, 6 J. BROAD. 197, 200 (1962).
1989]
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Broadcasters were enraged by the "Blue Book," viewing it as both
censorship and authoritarian rule over the industry. The Commission
stated that in issuing and renewing broadcasting licenses, appropriate
weight would be given to program service factors relevant to the public
interest, including the elimination of excessive ratios of advertising time
to program time.45 Broadcaster opposition made the "Blue Book" ineffec-
tive, although it never was officially repudiated by the Commission.46 Yet,
on the positive side, broadcasters also became concerned again about the
potential to editorialize, and more and more saw it as a part of public
service.
D. The Doctrine Emerges
The concept of prescribed fairness in broadcasting surfaced again in
1949 when the Commission issued a report entitled "In the Matter of
Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees." 47 This report resulted from hear-
ings held in 1948 because of the Commission's belief that further clari-
fication was needed with respect to the obligations of licensees to
broadcast news, commentary, and opinion. 48 Through the hearings the
commissioners sought to determine two specific matters:
1. Whether the expression of opinions by licensees on matters of public
interest and controversy is consistent with obligations to operate
their stations in public interest.
2. The relationship between any such editorial expression and the af-
firmative obligation of the licensees to ensure that a fair and equal
presentation of all sides of a controversial issue is made. 49
Representatives from the broadcasting industry as well as special in-
terest groups testified at these hearings. After hearing various sides of
the issues, the Commission reached some conclusions as to the future
handling of controversial issues. It noted the importance for the general
public to hear contrasting opinions from responsible elements of the com-
munity.50 The Commission knew that in order for the needs and interests
of the public to be met, some conflict had to be examined, but this posed
the problem of ensuring fairness during such presentations.
The life of each community involves a multitude of interests,
some dominant and all pervasive, such as interest in public
affairs, education and similar matters and some highly spe-
cialized and limited to few. The practical day-to-day problem
with which every licensee is faced is one of striking a balance
'15 E. KRASNOW AND L. LONGLEY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION, 127
(1978).
" Meyer, Reaction to the 'Blue Book', 6 J. BROAD. 295 (1962).
,7 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
4aId.
49 Id.
sold.
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between these various interests to reflect them in a program
service which is useful to the community, and which will in
some way fulfill the needs and interests of many. 1
Nonetheless, the Commission understood that the final choice had to lie
with the licensee. The broadcaster must decide which issues are contro-
versial and thus warrant the presentation of conflicting views. The Com-
mission's report lifted an eight-year ban on editorials that broadcasters
had imposed on themselves.
52
The report was clear in outlining the Commission's concern for fairness.
The Commission required an affirmative responsibility on the part of
broadcasters to devote a reasonable amount of time to the discussion of
public issues.53 Not all of the Commissioners felt the Editorializing Report
was valid. 54 Commissioner Edward Webster said the report "still leaves
a licensee in a quandary and a state of confusion in that he must follow
with his own interpretation of an involved academic legal treatise to
determine what he can or cannot do in his day-to-day operation."' 5 Com-
missioner Robert Jones issued a separate opinion that to grant true ed-
itorial privilege, there must be a reversal of the Mayflower decision "which
fully and completely suppressed and prohibited the licensee from speak-
ing in the future over his facilities in behalf of any cause.56 Commissioner
Frieda Hennock dissented from the Commission's decision.57 She agreed
with the concept of fairness in the presentation of controversial issues,
but said "the standard of fairness as delineated in the report is virtually
impossible of enforcement by the Commission with our present lack of
policing method and with the sanctions given us by law."' ,,
Broadcasters, on the other hand, generally praised the report. CBS
Board Chairman William S. Paley looked upon it as a great advancement
for broadcasting.59 The misgivings of the Commissioners aside, the report
was the first step in the development of the fairness doctrine. Some fifteen
years after the issuance of the Editorializing Report, broadcasters still
had questions about the function of the editorial in the context of public
service. In a 1964 report on the issue,60 the Commission briefly noted,
"the licensee is not required to editorialize ... is free to do so, but if he
does, he must meet the requirements of the fairness doctrine."
61
51 Id. at 1247.
11 Houser, The Fairness Doctrine - An Historical Perspective, 47 NoTRE DAME
L. REV. 550, 558 (1972).
See 47 C.F.R. 73.1910 (1985).
Houser, supra note 52, at 559.
Editorializing by Broadcast Licenses, 13 F.C.C. at 1258.
66 Id. at 1259.
71 Id. at 1270.
"Id.
11 Houser, supra note 52, at 560.
"Federal Communications Commission Applicability to the Fairness Doctrine
in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10,415
(1964).
61 Id. at 10,421.
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E. Congress Amends Section 315
It was not until 1959, however, that Congress amended Section 31562
of the Communications Act and included language that for the next
twenty-eight years would provide the basis for the Commission's enforce-
ment of the fairness doctrine. Section 315 is popularly known as the equal
opportunity rule. The provision requires a broadcast station which allows
a legally qualified candidate for public office to use its facilities to afford
an equal opportunity for use to all other legally qualified candidates for
that office. 63 This is true not only in special programming but also in
advertising time. Read in conjunction with Section 326, this section fur-
ther provides that broadcasting stations cannot censor paid political ad-
vertisements. On behalf of the broadcaster, the provision releases the
station from any liability for defamation that might arise from any such
advertisement. This release from liability was tested and upheld by the
Supreme Court in Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of Amer-
ica v. WDAY.
64
As might be expected, the drafters of the Section 315 carved out some
exceptions to the equal opportunities provision. The rule does not apply
to the appearance of a candidate in a bona fide newscast, news interview
program, news documentaries or coverage of a bona fide news event. The
latter part of the exception sheltered broadcasters from claims of minor
parties when they covered a debate sponsored by someone other than the
station itself. Although often misconstrued as such, the fairness doctrine
47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982).(a) Equal opportunities requirement; censorship prohibition; allowance of
station use; news appearances exception; public interest; public issue dis-
cussion opportunities.
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate
for public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal oppor-
tunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broad-
casting station, Provided: That such licensee shall have no power of
censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section.
No obligation is imposed under this subsection upon any licensee to allow
the use of its station by any such candidate. Appearance by a legally qual-
ified candidate on any-
(1) bona fide newscast
(2) bona fide news interview
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate is
incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered in the
news documentary) or
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including, but not lim-
ited to political conventions and activities incidental thereto),
shall not be deemed to be use of a broadcasting station within the meaning
of this subsection. Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as
relieving broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news
interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events,
from the obligation imposed upon them under this chapter to operate in the
public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of
conflicting views on issues of public importance. (emphasis added)
eId.
360 U.S. 525 (1959).
[Vol. 37:4
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was not an equal time provision. It was a loosely defined, difficult-to-
enforce standard aimed primarily at news and public affairs programming
and controversial public issues, and the much debated language pur-
portedly codifying the doctrine appears in the closing sentence of 315(a).
The actual language is ambiguous in its directive to broadcasters:
Nothing in [the equal opportunity exceptions] shall be con-
strued as relieving broadcasters, in connection with the pres-
entation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries,
and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation
imposed upon them under this Act to operate in the public
interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion
of conflicting views on issues of public importance. 65
Interpretation of this sentence has resulted in a two-fold obligation: First,
broadcasters must devote a reasonable amount of their broadcast time to
coverage of controversial issues of public importance, and second, they
must ensure that the coverage of these issues is fair in the sense that an
opportunity for contrasting points of view is provided. After twenty-eight
years of operation under this accepted wisdom, the Commission chal-
lenged the validity of the Act's language as actual codification of the
fairness doctrine, and subsequently repealed the doctrine.
PART II
From the very outset of broadcast regulation, lawmakers expressed
concern over the relationship between politics and the media. During the
debates about the Federal Radio Act, Senator Howell observed, "if all
candidates can not be heard, none should be heard. If both sides of a
question can not be heard over a particular radio station, none should be
heard. I can not emphasize this too strongly. '66 This political rhetoric
furnished results. Congress created the "equal opportunities" doctrine
designed to provide candidates for public office with an equal opportunity
for "using" a broadcast station.
The so-called equal opportunities rule, or Section 315, carries with it
the above restrictions, most notable of which are the exceptions of appl-
icability to newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries (where the
candidate's appearance is incidental to the subject matter) and on-the-
spot coverage of news events.67 These exceptions were added in 1959 when
Congress also added language which seemingly codified the fairness doc-
trine. 68
The importance of the rule can be measured by its application to ap-
pearances wholly unrelated to a candidate's bid for public office, such as
former President Ronald Reagan's movies made several years before his
presidential campaign.6 9
15 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982).
67 CONG. REC. 12,504.
" 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982).
See supra note 62.
1 Adrian Weiss. 59 F.C.C.2d 342 (1976).
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A. Political Editorials, Zapple, and the Personal Attack Rule
The Commission has promulgated numerous rules and regulations to
enhance the fairness doctrine. One such regulation is the political edi-
torial rule.70 This rule is reminiscent of the legislative discomfort over
editorializing illustrated in the Mayflower decision; yet, it is far less
inhibitive. Despite the repeal of the fairness doctrine, the political edi-
torializing rule remains in effect. Its future is uncertain. The Commission
refused to abolish the rule in the Meredith Broadcasting Corp. case.71 The
intention to keep the political editorializing rule alive, along with the
personal attack rule72 and the Zapple Doctrine, 73 was made clear in a
letter dated September 22, 1987, from F.C.C. Chairman Dennis R. Patrick
to Representative John D. Dingell, Chairman of the House Committee
70 47 C.F.R. § 73.1930 (1986):
(a) Where a licensee, in an editorial,
1) endorses or,
2) Opposes a legally qualified candidate or candidates, the licen-
see shall, within 24 hours after the editorial transmit to, respec-
tively,
(i) The other qualified candidate or candidates for the same
office or,
(ii) The candidate opposed in the editorial,
(A) Notification of the date and time of the editorial,
(B) A script or tape of the Editorial and,
(C) An offer or a spokesman of the candidate to respond over
the licensee's facilities. Where such editorials are broadcast
on the day of the election or within 72 hours prior to the day
of the election, the licensee shall comply with the provisions
of this paragraph sufficiently far in advance of the broadcast
to enable the candidate or candidates to have a reasonable
opportunity to prepare a response and present it in a timely
fashion.
(subsection (b) omitted)
7, Meredith Corp. v. F.C.C., 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The U.S. Court of
Appeals remanded an appeal from a finding by the F.C.C. of a fairness doctrine
violation by WTVH in Syracuse, New York. The language used by the court in
this case can be read in tandem with a decision by the court the previous year
in Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. F.C.C., 801 F.2d 501 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), which gave the Commission the support it needed to abolish the
fairness doctrine.
72 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1920):
(a) When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue
of public importance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character,
integrity or like personal qualities of an identified person or group,
the licensee shall, within a reasonable time and in no event later than
one week after the attack, transmit to the persons or group attacked:
(1) Notification of the date, time and identification of the broadcast;
(2) A script of tape (or accurate summary if a script or tape is not
available) of the attack; and
(3) An offer of a reasonable opportunity to respond over the licen-
see's facilities.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall not apply to
broadcast material which falls into one or more of the following cat-
egories:
(1) Personal attacks on foreign groups or foreign public figures;
(2) Personal attacks occurring during uses by legally qualified can-
didates;
[Vol. 37:4
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol37/iss4/5
RESURRECTING THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
on Energy and Commerce. The letter reads, in pertinent part:
Hence, because the enforcement of the political editorial rules,
the personal attack rules, the Zapple Doctrine, or the appli-
cation of the fairness doctrine to ballot issues were not before
it in the Meredith remand, the commission did not make any
specific decision on August 4 regarding these issues. Conse-
quently, broadcasters still must provide response air time to
any opponents of candidates they endorse in an editorial.
7 4
In 1970 the Commission further limited the licensee's discretion in the
political broadcasting arena by announcing what would be called by some
a "quasi-equal opportunity rule" or the Zapple Doctrine.7 5 The rule is
named for Nicholas Zapple, then communications counsel to the Senate
Commerce Committee. In a letter to the Commission dated May 6, 1970,
Zapple requested an interpretive ruling on fairness doctrine application
in situations involving the purchase of broadcast time by supporters of
political candidates. Specifically, where a candidate or his supporters
purchase time and the broadcast includes a discussion of issues in the
campaign, contains criticism of the opponent, or discusses the qualifica-
tions of the candidate, the other candidates or supporters must be allowed
to purchase a comparable amount of time if they desire.
7 6
Here the Commission essentially designed a hybrid between the equal
opportunities rule and the fairness doctrine. Under the fairness doctrine
as normally applied, comparable time allotments are not required. Under
Section 315, the candidate must appear to constitute a "use." Yet, this is
not a requirement under a Zapple application. In similar fashion, if one
candidate's supporters receive free time, so must the other candidate's
supporters, if they request it. However, there is no obligation to provide
free time to one candidate's supporters where the opponent's supporters
have purchased time. "Any such requirement would be an unwarranted
and inappropriate intrusion into the area of political campaign financ-
ing."77
The Zapple Doctrine deviates somewhat from the Cullman Doctrine
7 8
(3) Personal attacks made during broadcasts not included in par-
agraph (b)(2) of this section and made by legally qualified candidates,
their authorized spokespersons or those associated with them in the
campaign, on other such candidates, their authorized spokespersons
or persons associated with the candidates in the campaign; and
(4) Bona fide newscasts, bona fide news interviews, and on-the spot
coverage of bona fide news events, including commentary or analysis
contained in the foregoing programs.
(c) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall be applicable
to editorials of the licensee, except in the case of noncommercial ed-
ucational stations since they are precluded from editorializing (cita-
tions omitted).
13 Request by Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707 (1970).
14 Correspondence dated September 22, 1987, from Dennis R. Patrick, Chair-
man of the Federal Communications Committee to the Honorable John D. Dingell,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce.
75 See supra note 73.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 708 [footnote omitted].
18 Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963).
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where the Commission held "it is clear that the public's paramount right
to hear opposing views on controversial issues of public importance cannot
be nullified ... by the inability of the licensee to obtain paid sponsorship
of the broadcast time. 17 9 Yet, the logic is inconsistent. The Commission's
view is that it would be inappropriate to require licensees to, in effect,
subsidize the campaign of an opposing candidate by providing free time.
However, under the Culman Doctrine, other public issues had to receive
such treatment.
Both these doctrines passed scrutiny in the First Fairness Report. 8 The
Commission called the Zapple Doctrine "a common sense application of
the statutory scheme.""' In other words, Zapple was a logical outgrowth
of Section 315, rather than an extension of the fairness doctrine as it
would be if the Cullman Doctrine were applied. In fact, all the exceptions
to Section 315 have been held to apply equally to the Zapple Doctrine;
the fairness doctrine fully applies to such programs, including general
news coverage of candidates.8 2 "The controversial public issue in a polit-
ical race is who among the competing candidates for nomination or elec-
tion to an office should be chosen. The individual candidates represent
'contrasting viewpoints' on the overall issue of which should be elected
")83
The broadcaster is afforded wide discretion in determining how much
coverage to allot each candidate, but the coverage must be reasonable.
Minor party candidates need not receive as much coverage as the major
parties do, yet the disparity must also be reasonable.8 4 The Cullman
Doctrine, however, was repealed along with the fairness doctrine.85
To aid enforcement of the fairness doctrine, the Commission in 1967
promulgated the personal attack rule. 8 The rule provides access to those
individuals whose reputation has been attacked during a broadcast. These
regulations, along with this parent fairness doctrine faced scrutiny by
courts and the Commission itself in the 1970s.
B. Quasi-Judicial and Judicial Review
In 1971 the Commission decided once again to study the efficacy of the
fairness doctrineY1 This time the report was prompted by increased de-
mand for access to broadcast media and discussion of public issues. The
report looked into four broad categories: "1) the fairness doctrine gen-
erally, 2) access to broadcast media as a result of the presentation of
79Id. at 577.
The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standards of the Communications Act (First Report - Handling of Polit-
ical Broadcast) 36 F.C.C.2d 40 (1972).81Id. at 49.
82 Democratic National Committee, 91 F.C.C.2d 1170 (1982).
The Primer, 100 F.C.C.2d 1476 (1984).
American Independent Party, 62 F.C.C.2d 4, 12 (1976).
In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Red 5043 (1987).See supra note 72.
87 The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standards of the Communications Act (Notice of Inquiry), 30 F.C.C.2d
26 (1971).
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product commercials, 3) access generally for the discussion of public issues
and 4) application of the fairness doctrine to political broadcasts. '8
Twenty-two years had passed since the 1949 Editorializing Report, and
in part one of the study the Commission noted that it had not been
necessary to "formulate detailed and definitive guidelines for licensees
applying the fairness doctrine in their day-to-day operations," excepting,
or course, the personal attack and political editorializing rules.8 9 Con-
sequently, the Commission saw this to be the time to test whether it was
necessary to formulate such guidelines and perhaps more important to
determine if the doctrine did not "promote the fundamental purposes of
the First Amendment. 9 °
The second area of inquiry had its origin in the courts. The issue con-
cerned the application of the fairness doctrine to product advertising.
Products, such as cars, detergents, and those packaged in non-biode-
gradable containers, posed serious environmental questions. Echoing the
sentiment of the courts, the Commission observed "that product com-
mercials can carry implicit messages and that pertinent national policies
should be taken into account."91 Some of the concern in this matter at
the time could be attributed to the recent Banzhaf decision from the court
of appeals.
92
Any restrictions in this area could have serious consequences for both
the broadcaster and the advertiser. Simultaneously, First Amendment
scholars were watching this area carefully as the F.C.C. called for "com-
ment, pro and con, on the policy implications and the pragmatic effects
of this equation."93
Only brief attention was given to a general right of access to broadcast
facilities for discussion of public issues. While some have argued, fairness
doctrine aside, those wishing to express a particular viewpoint may al-
ways purchase access to broadcast media, the Commission has held to its
position that "there is neither Constitutional nor statutory right for any
individual or group to present their views, and that as a matter of policy
it would not serve the public interest to act as if there were.
94
In the area of political broadcasting, the Zapple Doctrine95 led the dis-
cussion. The critical question focused on what, if any, changes should
occur with this quasi-equal opportunities doctrine, particularly when bal-
anced with Section 315. One year later, political broadcasting became the
main subject of another F.C.C. report.96 In it, the Commission again ex-
S Id.
Id. at 28.
90Id.91Id. at 30.
92 Banzhaf v. F.C.C., 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969). The Commission ruled that the fairness doctrine is applicable to cigarette
advertisements, and thus stations airing such commercials must also provide free
anti-smoking public services messages.
9 The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standards of the Communications Act (Notice of Inquiry) 30 F.C.C.2d at
32.9 Id. at 33.
91 See discussion supra p. 17.
The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standards of the Communications Act (First Report - Handling of Polit-
ical Broadcast), 36 F.C.C.2d 40 (1972).
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plained the Zapple Doctrine as a "particularization of what the public
interest calls for in certain political broadcast situations in light of the
Congressional policies set forth in [the equal opportunities rule]. 97
During the following year, the Commission resurrected its political
broadcasting policy in the midst of pending court cases and the impending
general election.9 The Commission had solicited comments from various
factions involved in political broadcasting. "I'wo commentators, Demo-
cratic National Committee (DNC) and American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) suggest[ed] that the Commission extend the fairness doc-
trine or adopt a specific rule that would require licensees to broadcast
the opposing views of appropriate spokesmen following the appearance
of a public official."99
DNC voiced considerable concern about appearances made by the Pres-
ident and the lack of comparable access by members of its organization. 100
Of course, DNC members appeared on other news interview programs
where they could respond to questions about the President's message.
However, no opportunity existed for "a reasoned and uninterrupted pres-
entation of the issues.""' Under the pattern presented by the DNC, li-
censees were, in fact, following the mandate of the fairness doctrine. The
doctrine requires a balance in the overall programming of the licensees,
not a one-for-one response ratio. 0 2 On the other hand, the National Broad-
casting Company (NBC) sharply criticized ACLU/DNC's call for a right
to reply to appearances of public officials. NBC maintained that
"[c]reation of an equal or quasi-equal time right to reply to all public
official addresses would, as a practical matter, inhibit the appearance of
public officials .... ,""13 WGN Broadcasting Company sided with NBC and
added, "that the F.C.C. would be inexorably involved in politically sen-
sitive adjudications ....
While the Commission urged broadcasters "to make maximum possible
contributions to the nation's political process,"'' 0 it found that "it would
not be sound policy to adopt the DNC or ACLU proposals.."' 1 6 The Com-
971 Id. at 49.
9 1 Id. at 40.
"Id. at 43.
10OId.
101 The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standards of the Communications Act (First Report - Handling of Polit-
ical Broadcast), 36 F.C.C.2d 40, 43 (1972).
102 Id. at 44.
1
0 3 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 54.
106 The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standards of the Communications Act (First Report - Handling of Polit-
ical Broadcast), 36 F.C.C.2d 40, 48 (1972). It is important to note here that the
Supreme Court rejected an individual right of access approach in CBS v. DNC,
412 U.S. 94 (1973) and warned that "[i]f the fairness doctrine were applied to
editorial advertising, there is also substantial danger that the effective operation
of the doctrine would be jeopardized.
The result would be a further erosion of the journalistic discretion of broad-
casters in the coverage of public issues, and a transfer of control over the treatment
of public issues from the licensees who are accountable for broadcast performance
to private individuals who are not." 412 U.S. at 124.
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mission did, however, again urge Congress to enact its earlier proposal
setting forth another exemption to 315(a).107
The following year the Commission readdressed the concern arising
over product advertising and the fairness doctrine. 108 The report looked
at two main types of advertising: 1) editorial advertisements; and 2)
advertisements for commercial products and services.'0 9
"Some 'commercials' actually consist of direct and substantial com-
mentary on important public issues." 0 The Commission ruled that the
fairness doctrine applies to such advertisements. Yet, commercials that
are designed to promote a positive public image of a corporation or in-
dustry generally constitute "a legitimate commercial practice and ordi-
narily does not involve debate on public issues.""'
Commercials promoting controversial products or services will invoke
the fairness doctrine only when they are "devoted in an obvious and
meaningful way to the discussion of public issues.""' 2 This finding marked
a change from the impetus for the Banzhaf decision in 1967.' 3
The 1974 Report angered and confused some members of the Commis-
sion and the community, so much so that the F.C.C. needed to reconsider
it just two years later. On March 24, 1976, the Commission released the
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration of the Fairness Re-
port. "1 4 "The petitions for reconsideration present a vigorous disagreement
with the Report's position on applying the doctrine to standard product
commercial advertising .... " The Commission declared "that the public
interest would be served best by not applying the doctrine to standard
product commercials.""' 6 The petitioners, differing with the F.C.C.'s po-
sition, suggested the Commission was "without power to effect such a
change, and that it failed to articulate sufficient grounds for the policy.1' 17
107 First Report - Handling of Political Broadcast, 36 F.C.C.2d 40, 52 (1970):
(5) any other program of a news or journalistic character-
(i) which is regularly scheduled; and(ii) in which the content, format and participants are determined
by the licensee or network; and
(iii) which explores conflicting views on a current issue of public
importance; and(iv) which is not designed to serve the political advantage of any
legally qualified candidate.
108 The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standards of the Communication Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974).
"0 Id. at 22.
a 10 Id.
' Id. at 23.
1'Id. at 26.
11 Banzhaf v. F.C.C., 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969).
114 58 F.C.C.2d 691 (1976).
's Id.
's Id. at 697. Footnote 10 defined standard commercials as "[c]ommercials
which simply sell a product and do not deal meaningfully with a controversial
issue of public importance." Id. at n.10.
117 Id. at 698.
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The Commission reaffirmed its conviction that it indeed had the au-
thority to make such changes and that it adequately explained its position
in the 1974 Report. To this end, it further noted the United States Court
of Appeals decision in Public Interest Research Group v. F.C.C.,118 where
the judges in the First Circuit found "the Commission had acted within
its statutory authority when it 'with appropriate notice and ... sufficient
clarity' concluded that it was in the public interest to 'abandon [its] earlier
precedents and frame new policies.' "119 Relying on this decision as well
as CBS where the Supreme Court dubbed the Commission the "overseer
and ultimate arbiter and guardian of the public interest,"'120 the Com-
mission denied the petitions for reconsideration.
The question of the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine reached
the United States Supreme Court in 1969 in Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. F. C. C."' This landmark decision struck a blow to broadcasters and
First Amendment devotees who viewed the regulation as violative of the
constitutionally mandated freedoms of speech and press.
Red Lion actually involved two cases which made their way to the
Supreme Court. The first, Red Lion, questioned the legality of applying
the fairness doctrine to a particular program. The second, brought by the
Radio Television News Directors Association (RTNDA), arose "as an ac-
tion to review the F.C.C.'s 1967 promulgation of the personal attack and
political editorializing regulations .... ,"122 The facts of Red Lion arguably
constitute a personal attack, however, the rule was not in existence at
the time the original case was filed.
Red Lion Broadcasting Company operated radio station WGCB in Red
Lion, Pennsylvania. The station carried a program called "Christian Cru-
sade," hosted by the Reverend Billy James Hargis. During one of the
broadcasts, Hargis discussed a book entitled Goldwater-Extremist on the
Right, written by Fred J. Cook. Hargis said the book was designed "to
smear and destroy Barry Goldwater."'12 He also asserted that its author,
Cook, had worked for a communist publication (The Nation), been fired
from the New York World Telegram for making false accusations against
a New York City official, sympathized with Alger Hiss and attacked the
FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency. 24
WGCB refused to provide Cook with free air time in which to respond
to the charges made by Hargis."25 The Commission viewed the station's
decision as a violation of the fairness doctrine, and the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, after initially dismissing the case,
upheld the Commission's position. 1 6
522 F.2d 1060, 1062 (1st Cir. 1975).
58 F.C.C.2d at 698, quoting Public Interest Research Group v. F.C.C., 522
F.2d 1060, 1065 (1st Cir. 1975).
120 Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm. (1972) 412
U.S. 94, 117.
121 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
22 Id. at 371.
123 Id.
124 Id., n.2.
1 Id. at 372.
126 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 372 (1969).
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In the RTNDA suit the news directors challenged the personal attack
and political editorializing rules as an abridgement of free speech and
free press. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held the rules
unconstitutional, 2 7 causing a split on the intermediate appellate level on
the question of the fairness doctrine's constitutionality. The Supreme
Court answered the constitutionality question in the affirmative. In writ-
ing the majority opinion, Justice White wrote:
Believing that the specific application of the fairness doctrine
in Red Lion, and the promulgation of the regulations in
RTNDA, are both authorized by Congress and enhance rather
than abridge the freedoms of speech and press protected by the
First Amendment, we hold them valid and constitutional
.... 128 [W]e think the fairness doctrine and its component per-
sonal attack and political editorializing regulations are a le-
gitimate exercise of congressionally delegated authority. 129
The Court's opinion indicated the Commission merely enforced congres-
sional policy, and did not "[embark] on a frolic of its own.' 130 To justify
the Commission's authority to make such regulations, the Court quoted
the language of 47 U.S.C. § 303, which in pertinent part, states, the
"'Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or ne-
cessity requires' [may] promulgate 'such rules and regulations and pre-
scribe such restrictions and conditions ... as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of this chapter .... ,
Perhaps most important in light of recent developments in the contro-
versy over the fairness doctrine 3 2 is the Court's careful scrutiny of the
legislation intending to codify the doctrine. The opinion quotes the 1959
Amendment which includes broad language that has, through the Com-
mission's enhancement, become the fairness doctrine. 133 The Court read
the statute as announcing a "public interest" standard, and then asserted
that "the amendment vindicated the F.C.C.'s general view that the fair-
ness doctrine inhered in the public interest standard."' 34 And in support
of the doctrine's congressional codification, rather than citing abuse of
authority by the Commission, the opinion stated, "the Congress has not
just kept its silence by refusing to overturn the administrative construc-
tion, but has ratified it with positive legislation."'13 5
C. First Amendment Complications
The main thrust of the broadcasters' argument against the fairness
doctrine is that it violated their rights of free speech and press under the
127 RTNDA v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S.
Ct. 631 (1969).
128 395 U.S. at 375.
1"9 1d. at 385.
120 Id. at 375.
131 Id. at 379.
32 See infra p. 34.
"I See n. 62, supra.
114 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969).
115 Id. at 381-82, (footnote omitted).
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First Amendment. 3 6 In the third part of its opinion, the Court explicitly
faced this issue: "Although broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by
a First Amendment interest, differences in the characteristics of news
media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to
them."137
In crushing the broadcasters' contention, the Court observed, "[tihere
is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from
requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others .... 138 Thus, there
is an obligation on the part of broadcasters to act as a "fiduciary" with
respect to the views of the community.139 "[A]s far as the First Amendment
is concerned those who are licensed stand no better than those to whom
licenses are refused."'140
To this end, the Court resurrected the scarcity argument, the time-
honored rationale behind broadcast regulation in the late twenties.
"Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast
than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unbridgeable
First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every
individual to speak, write, or publish."'4' Despite advancement in tech-
nology creating new frequency allocations, the Court held steadfast to its
view that "[sicarcity is not entirely a thing of the past."'142 Although
frequency allocation has increased, "uses for that spectrum have also
grown apace."' 14
3
The Court's insistence on considering broadcast media different from
other forms manifested itself again in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo.4 4 Here, the Court struck down a state's "right-of-reply" statute
which closely resembled the personal attack and political editorializing
rules, but for its application to newspapers. 14
13 Id. at 386.
13 Id. (citations omitted).
138 Id. at 389.
183 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 369, 389 (1969).
140Id.
141 Id. at 388.
142 Id. at 396.
141 Id. at 397.
" 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
11 Id. at 244-45, n.2.
[Fla. Stat. §] 104.38 [(1973)] Newspaper assailing candidate in an
election; space for reply-If any newspaper in its columns assails the
personal character of any candidate for nomination or for election in
any election, or charges said candidate with malfeasance or misfeas-
ance in office, or otherwise attacks his official record, or gives to an-
other free space for such purpose, such newspaper shall upon request
of such candidate immediately publish free of cost any reply he may
make thereto in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type
as the matter that calls for such reply, provided such reply does not
take up more space than the matter replied to. Any person or firm
failing to comply with the provisions of this section shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in [§
775.082] or [§] 775.083.
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Ironically, the Court also recognized a developing scarcity in the news-
paper industry, yet it still managed to reach a conclusion opposite from
Red Lion. "[Tihe same economic factors which have caused the disap-
pearance of vast numbers of metropolitan newspapers have made entry
into the marketplace of ideas served by the print media almost impos-
sible."146 The Court was responding to the theory that anyone can start
a newspaper as long as he or she has the financial resources, while the
spectrum is limited. In fact, the economic reality of the newspaper pub-
lishing business has effectively foreclosed most from engaging in that
enterprise and thus has created an environment resembling that of the
broadcaster.
Nevertheless, according to the Court, government should not regulate
editorial content. "The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the
decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and
the treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or un-
fair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment."1 47 "A re-
sponsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility
is not mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot
be legislated.'
'1 48
Thirteen years after Miami Herald and two decades since Red Lion,
the number of newspapers in the United States is still declining while
advancement in broadcast technology continues to create new channel
capacity. The double standard announced by the Court several years ago
is now outdated, and in need of serious rethinking. Perhaps this is the
reason Justice White in the majority opinion left open the possibility of
change: "And if experience with the administration of these doctrines
indicates that they have the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing
the volume and quality of coverage, there will be time enough to recon-
sider the constitutional implications.'
1 49
PART III
A. The Doctrine at Death's Door
On October 20, 1981, two bills were introduced into Congress to der-
egulate broadcasting. 150 H.R. 4780 was designed to "modify requirements
under the fairness doctrine applicable to broadcasters,"'151 while H.R. 4781
would have repealed the equal opportunity rules.' 2 These changes would
have eliminated the requirement of
carrying out the obligation specified in the [Communications
Act of 1934], to permit any person desiring to present conflict-
146 Id. at 251 (footnote omitted).
1
4
1 Id. at 258.
148 Id. at 256.
'
49 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969).
110 H.R. 4780 and H.R. 4781, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
" ' H.R. 4780 at 1.
152 H.R. 4781.
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ing views on issues of public importance to use the broadcast
station facilities upon terms and conditions which are different
from the terms and conditions made applicable by such broad-
casters to other persons presenting their views on such is-
sues.
1 5 3
This bill, in effect, would release broadcasters from the obligations of
giving free time to respond to a controversial paid advertisement, which
was the situation in the Banzhaf case.
The justification statement for H.R. 4781 claimed that Section 315
imposed a "hierarchy of speech values which unnecessarily and improp-
erly restricts the discretion of broadcasters in fulfilling their public in-
terest obligations and journalistic responsibilities.' ' 4
One of the principal figures responsible for stopping this legislation
from becoming law was Representative John Dingell of Michigan. Dingell
serves as chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, and
in testifying before the Telecommunications Subcommittee, he said the
efforts to abolish the fairness doctrine and equal opportunity rules clearly
indicate that "deregulation fever has reached epidemic proportions."'15
In response to the argument that the broadcasting industry no longer
experiences spectrum scarcity in light of advancing technology, Dingell
countered:
[A] tremendous new diversity in video resources is on the ho-
rizon, but the availability of new technologies is still a tan-
talizing promise to the overwhelming majority of our citizens.
And I would point out that many of the same people who seek
relief from the equal time and fairness doctrines will be those
who will own and control these new technologies and one must
question how there will be any significant increase in diversity
or any assurance that all views will be fairly presented. 156
Dingell added that he realized broadcasters would be unhappy with his
stance, but, he said, scarcity would continue, and the public would con-
tinue to need the protection of the fairness doctrine and equal opportunity
provision. He subscribes to the philosophy that free and open discussion
is essential to democracy, and that protecting discussion is the respon-
sibility of the government. 15
7
Representative James Collins of Texas, the prime sponsor of H.R. 4780
and H.R. 4781, defended his bills by saying they would remove significant
regulatory burdens from broadcasters. 58 He believed it was unfair for
15B3 H.R. 4780 at 1, 2.
154 In the Matter of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant, Stem-
ming from the Comparative Hearing Process, 1981: Hearing on H.R. 4780 and
H.R. 4781 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection,
and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
61 (1981) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Henry Rivera, Commissioner).
115 Id. at 64.
156Id.
157 Id. at 65.
118 Id. at 71.
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broadcasters to provide free air time to someone who wished to respond
to a controversial viewpoint expressed in a commercial or some other
form of paid programming. 1 9 As for the equal opportunity rules, Collins
argued that the broadcaster should be allowed to use his own judgment
in deciding to air programs where political candidates appear. Collins
was convinced that in the "competitive information services market...
all candidates will be able to find outlets on which to express their opin-
ions."160
In October 1983, Senator Robert Packwood of Oregon, chairman of the
Senate Commerce Committee and long-time broadcasting advocate, in-
troduced legislation that would repeal both the fairness doctrine and the
equal opportunity rules. The bill, labeled the Freedom of Expression
Act, ' 61 faced considerable opposition in Congress and eventually fell to
defeat. Yet with the machinery in Congress beginning to move in the
direction of deregulation, the Commission seized the opportunity to use
the momentum in its favor.
It was no secret that former Commission Chairman Mark Folwer, a
Reagan appointee, strongly supported deregulation of the broadcasting
industry. Fowler had often asserted that the television industry owed no
debt of social responsibility for using the airwaves, in fact according to
Fowler, "television is just another appliance. It's a toaster with pic-
tures.1 62 Consequently, it came as no surprise when Fowler's Commission
issued a Notice of Inquiry in 1984 designed to "reassess the wisdom of
applying general fairness doctrine obligations to broadcast licensees." 163
The Notice came in the wake of a Commission proposal a year earlier
to repeal both the personal attack and political editorializing rules since
they appeared "contrary to First Amendment precepts." 1"4 The rationale
relied upon by the Commission sounded much the same as that touted
by deregulation advocates in Congress and the broadcasting industry.
A preliminary analysis indicates that significant new devel-
opments and changes in the electronic and print media over
the past decade have contributed to an extremely dynamic,
robust, and diverse marketplace of ideas that may call into
question the continued necessity of the doctrine as a means of
ensuring the attainment of First Amendment objectives. 165
After a year of hearings on the matter the Commission decided as a
policy matter the fairness doctrine no longer serves the public interest.
The study had uncovered several problem areas, and although the Com-
mission clearly favored repeal of the doctrine, it recognized:
[T]here are viable arguments on both sides of the issue con-
cerning whether or not the doctrine is codified, that various
119 Hearing, supra note 154, at 71.
1-0 Id. at 72.
61 S. 1917, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
162 Stengel, Evangelist of the Marketplace, TIME, November 21, 1983, at 58.
'6' 49 Fed. Reg. 20,317 (1984).
' 48 Fed. Reg. 28,295 at 28,301 (1983).
16649 Fed. Reg. 20,317-20,318 (1984).
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legislative proposals concerning the doctrine are before Con-
gress and the Congress has expressed intense interest in the
doctrine, [therefore] the Commission chose not to eliminate or
alter the fairness doctrine. 166
Nevertheless, the Commission offered the results of its study to Congress
to give it the "opportunity to review the doctrine in light of the record
compiled."1
67
The report attacked the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine. Al-
though it had been upheld since Red Lion, "the constitutional permis-
sibility of the fairness doctrine [was] predicated upon a factual
presumption that the doctrine has the effect of enhancing the coverage
of controversial issues available to the viewing and listening public."''
What the Commission study found was, in fact, the opposite result.
169
Broadcasters viewed the doctrine as burdensome and consequently sought
mostly to avoid its application altogether. In doing so, stations avoided
airing controversial issues of public importance. 170 The effect of this was
obviously that the fairness doctrine was undermining itself and, in the
process, undermining the First Amendment. Through negative enforce-
ment, broadcasters were programming to avoid governmental interfer-
ence. Accordingly, the fairness doctrine, instead of promoting the interest
of the First Amendment, ran contrary to the relationship between gov-
ernment and media envisioned by the founders of the republic. "The
framers of the First Amendment proscribed the government from placing
its official imprimatur on any particular viewpoint; they presumed that
the marketplace of ideas would flourish best without the necessity or
danger of governmental intervention."' 7 1
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Commission's report, was
the controversy surrounding codification. A legitimate dispute exists
about whether the language in Section 315(a) was actually intended to
embody the fairness principle of the Commission. "[O]pponents... argue
that if Congress had intended this language to codify the fairness doctrine,
it would have made its intent clear, as it has done in many other enact-
ments."172
The Court of Appeals, in dicta, in a case to determine the applicability
of broadcast regulation to teletext, found no evidence of congressional
intent to codify the fairness doctrine. 173 In examining the 1959 Amend-
ment to the Communications Act, the Court disagreed with the petition-
er's suggestion that the language in Section 315 amounted to codification
of the doctrine.
We do not believe that language adopted in 1959 made the
fairness doctrine a binding statutory obligation; rather, it ra-
166 50 Fed. Reg. 35,418 (1985).
1 6 7 Id.
"I Id. at 35,420.
169 Id.
"0 Id. at 35,426.
11 Id. at 35,420.
172 Id. at 35,449 (footnote omitted).
17 Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. F.C.C., 801 F.2d 501, 517
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
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tified the Commission's longstanding position that the public
interest standard authorizes the fairness doctrine. The lan-
guage, by its plain import, neither creates nor imposes any
obligation, but seeks to make it clear that the statutory amend-
ment does not affect the fairness doctrine obligation as the
Commission had previously applied it."1
As further support for this position, the court focused on the amend-
ment's speaking to an obligation imposed "under the Act." The suggestion
was made that this phrase, as opposed to "by the Act," clarified Congress'
intention that the doctrine was effected by authority'conferred under the
Act rather than a specific provision in the Act. 175 The decision paved the
way for the Commission to abolish the doctrine because the force of the
fairness doctrine rested with Commission authority rather than congres-
sional enactment. The mechanism through which the Commission could
abolish the doctrine also came from the District of Columbia Circuit in
Meredith Corp. v. F.C.C.176
Meredith was an appeal from a Commission finding that Meredith Cor-
poration's television station WTVH of Syracuse, New York violated the
fairness doctrine in 1982 when it broadcast three commercials sponsored
by the Energy Association of New York.177 The controversy stemmed from
allegations made within the advertisements that a nuclear power plant
was a "sound investment for New York's future. 1 7 Syracuse Peace Coun-
cil challenged the lack of opposing viewpoints. 179
The Court remanded the case to the Commission for consideration of
the argument that the doctrine was unconstitutional in general and as
applied to Meredith Corporation. 180 On remand the Commission abolished
the fairness doctrine.18 1 The commission reported,
the doctrine's infirmity of impermissibly chilling and reducing
the discussion of controversial issues of public importance is
not an infirmity resulting from the enforcement of the doctrine
in this particular case or in particular markets, but is an in-
firmity that goes to the very heart of the enforcement of the
fairness doctrine as a general matter.1 8 2
Consequently, the Commission used the broad sweep of free speech
grounds to abolish a doctrine whose original intent was to promote di-
versity of opinion.
Syracuse Peace Council appealed the Commission's decision.183 The
Court concluded the Commission's decision to abolish the fairness doc-
174 Id.
175 Id. at 518.
176 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
177 Id. at 865.
178 Id at 866.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 874.
181 In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. 5043, 5057-58 (1987).
182 2 F.C.C. at 5047.
1' Syracuse Peace Council v. F.C.C., 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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trine was not "arbitrary, capricious nor an abuse of discretion."' Thus,
once again, the court was able to purposely evade the constitutional is-
sue.
1 85
The issue resurfaced in Congress in 1986 when the Commission was
directed to examine alternatives to enforcing fairness. 8 6 After the remand
by the District of Columbia Circuit, then F.C.C. chairman Mark S. Fowler
told members of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce,
Justice and State the Commission would not decide the Meredith case
until it reported to Congress on alternative measure of enforcement.
18 7
That report was released on August 4, 1987, the very day the Meredith
decision was handed down.'
Prior to the doctrine's regulatory demise, the Senate passed S.742 cod-
ifying the fairness doctrine.8 9 The accompanying report concluded that
scarcity of broadcast frequencies remains, and thus the Supreme Court's
decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C. 90 is still good law. On
June 3, 1987, the House passed similar legislation.' 9' Sixteen days later
President Reagan vetoed S.742 saying, "It]his type of content-based reg-
ulation by the Federal Government is, in my judgment, antagonistic to
the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment."' 92 The
President opined that the fairness doctrine was unconstitutional. 193 In-
stead of attempting override, the Senate referred the President's veto to
the Commerce Committee.
1 94
Subsequent to the doctrine's repeal, Congress attempted passage once
again. A few weeks before the Christmas recess in 1987, the House
adopted a rider amendment to the fiscal 1988 omnibus appropriation
bill.195 The amendment, sponsored by the Commerce Chairman Dingell,
was dropped after President Reagan threatened an eleventh-hour veto. 196
PART IV
During its life, the fairness doctrine did not provide the public with an
opportunity for access. The broadcaster might be sanctioned only after a
14Id. at 669.
-5 Id.
19 Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100
Stat. 1783 (1986).
181 46 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 482 (1988).
"m In the Matter of Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules
and Regulations concerning Alternatives to the General Fairness Doctrine Ob-
ligations of Broadcast Licensees, 2 F.C.C. 5272 (1987).
I'l S. 742, 100th Cong., 1st Session (1987). See 45 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 801
(1987).
190 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
191 45 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 1214 (1987).
192 Message from the President of the United States returning without my
approval S. 742, the Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987, which would codify
the so-called fairness doctrine, S. Doc. No. 100-10, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
193 Id.
194 45 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 1407 (1987).
195 H.R.J. Res. 395, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
1 45 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 3185 (1987).
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showing that the station reneged on its duty to cover controversial issues
of importance to the community, or more commonly, if in the process of
such coverage failed to present a balance of opposing viewpoints. Diffi-
culty in enforcement rendered the doctrine ineffective.1 97 Nonetheless,
broadcasters claimed the fear of FCC reprisal kept them from covering
controversial issues (which, in itself, was enough to levy sanctions under
the doctrine). Broadcasters argue this matter under the penumbra of the
First Amendment, and there is where the solution to this problem is
found.
Fairness complaints should arrive to the Commission and subsequently
the courts with a strong presumption against validity. To mount a fairness
case against a broadcast station, a complainant would be required to
present clear and convincing evidence of a violation. The complainant
must also provide the Commission with a detailed tracking of program-
ming during the period of the requisite controversy. Such evidence would
necessarily include proof that a controversial issue exists. For guidance,
courts could look to the standard set forth in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
wherein limited purpose public figure status does not attach without
evidence of an existing public controversy. 91 Moreover, if the station could
show that avenues for access exist, such as outside editorials on some
regular basis, the broadcaster would be entitled to summary dismissal of
the complaint.
Presumptions in favor of the media are part of a long First Amendment
tradition. In 1931, the Supreme Court ruled that prior restraints against
the press are presumptively unconstitutional. 99 To restrain publication
or broadcast of information and thus overcome the presumptions, the
government has to meet a heavy burden of proof. 00
A similar burden could be adopted in fairness doctrine cases because
sanctions for not airing material are as heinous as restraints against
publishing materials in the context of the First Amendment. In any event,
all complaints not summarily dismissed for failure to meet the heavy
burden of proof would be held for review by the Commission at the sta-
tion's license renewal time. This method of reviewing fairness complaints
would essentially free the broadcaster from defending its broadcast record
during the license term. By placing a heavy burden on the complainant,
this alternative would allow for expedient Commission dismissal of all
but the most highly documented claims. Moreover, by holding valid com-
plaints until the renewal process, the Commission can consider them in
light of the station's overall public service record.
197 See Note, "In Stark Contravention of Its Purpose": Federal Communications
Commission Enforcement and Repeal of the Fairness Doctrine, 20 J. L. REFORM
799 (1987).
1gg 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974).
19 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
20 See generally, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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CONCLUSION
Whatever the outcome of the current attempts to legislate a fairness
doctrine, ultimate enforcement rests with the Federal Communications
Commission. The Commission's view toward prescribed fairness has been
made clear over the past few years. Yet the discomfort with the doctrine
by previous Commissions is shown by the inability to decide precisely
how the doctrine should function in the broadcast marketplace. Most
would agree that broadcasters should fairly cover controversial issues,
yet not everyone can agree on a method for ensuring such coverage. The
proposal outlined above gives broadcasters solace in knowing they occupy
a preferred position while, at the same time, affords the audience a narrow
spectrum of opportunity to correct deliberate and valid violations.
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